HEB: Hybrid Expenditure Blockchain by Tsabary, Itay et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
91
1.
04
12
4v
4 
 [c
s.C
R]
  2
5 J
an
 20
20
HEB: Hybrid Expenditure Blockchain
Itay Tsabary
Technion, IC3
sitay@campus.technion.ac.il
Alexander Spiegleman
VMware Research
spiegelmans@vmware.com
Ittay Eyal
Technion, VMware Research, IC3
ittay@technion.ac.il
ABSTRACT
The study of Proof of Work (PoW ) has culminated with the intro-
duction of cryptocurrency blockchains like Bitcoin. These protocols
require their operators, calledminers, to expend computational re-
sources and they reward themwith minted cryptocurrency tokens.
The system is secure from attackers who cannot expend resources
at a rate equivalent to that of all benign miners. But the resource
requirement is arbitrary – the product of the number of minted
tokens and their real value.
We present Hybrid Expenditure Blockchain (HEB), a novel cryp-
tocurrency PoW protocol that allows its designer to tune external
expenditure. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first tunable
PoW protocol. Despite the reduced resource expenditure, it main-
tains the security guarantees of pure PoW protocols against ratio-
nal attacks.
HEB has practical implications, as global power expenditure on
PoW blockchains exceeds that of a medium-sized country. Apply-
ing HEB in operational PoW systems can significantly reduce their
ecological footprint.
1 INTRODUCTION
Since the introduction of Nakamoto’s blockchain and Bitcoin [71],
there has been a renaissance of cryptocurrency blockchain proto-
cols, with a market cap estimated at US$250B [28]. In such systems
principals calledminersmaintain a currency, including minting of
tokens and facilitating system-internal token transactions.
Unlike pre-Bitcoin systems, they are decentralized,with no privi-
leged entities. They are also permissionless, allowing miners to join
the system without permission of existing participants. To achieve
these properties, systems including Bitcoin [71] and Ethereum [17]
utilize Proof of Work (PoW ) [33, 54]. PoW protocols require miners
to continuously expend resources, namely electricity, forcing an
attacker to expend at a higher rate than all other miners combined.
That makes them very expensive to attack. Pow systems secure
80% (US$200B) of the capital in the cryptocurrency market [28].
To compensate for their resource expenditure, cryptocurrencies
reward miners with tokens, which they can sell at market price
for fiat currency (e.g., USD, EUR). Thus, higher token prices imply
higher mining rewards, drawing more miners to participate, creat-
ing competition and leading to more expended resources. That is,
PoW electricity expenditure depends directly on cryptocurrency
value. Indeed, with the rise of cryptocurrency prices, the amount
of resources spent on PoW mining has been exponentially grow-
ing [12, 36], with significant ecological impact [1, 2, 30, 35, 47, 48,
67]. Bitcoin alone is responsible for about 0.24% of the global elec-
tricity usage [29, 42], surpassing countries like Austria and Colom-
bia. This level of resource guzzling is arbitrary – the expenditure
on security of existing PoW protocols equals their mining profits,
and the system designer had no means of reducing the ecological
impact.
In this work we present Hybrid Expenditure Blockchain (HEB) —
a tunable PoW cryptocurrency protocol that lowers electricity con-
sumption compared to classical PoW protocols, while providing
similar security guarantees against rational attackers.
Previous work (§2) explored less environmentally-damaging al-
ternatives, including expending different resources [10, 70], and
performing useful rather than useless work [7, 82]. These solu-
tions either waste different resources, make different assumptions,
or provide different guarantees.
Another alternative is Proof of Stake (PoS) [43, 46, 59], which also
operates under different model assumptions and avoids external re-
source expenditure altogether. PoS shares some elements with this
work, prominently the utilization of the system token for security.
However, the model assumptions, the solution, and the guarantees
are distinct. In particular, we use the standard PoW assumptions,
and unlike PoS miners expend (lose) their tokens for mining.
To reason aboutHEBwe first refine the standard model for cryp-
tocurrency systems (§3). As usual, we consider a set of rational
miners that optimize their revenues [20, 40, 45, 76, 79] and an ad-
versary who is willing to expend resources in order to attack. But
in addition, we define the relation of cryptocurrency price and its
minting rate based on the equation of exchange [16, 18, 69]. We
emphasize that HEB maintains the same economic properties of
a classical cryptocurrency system, specifically with respect to its
token minting rate.
Nakamoto’s protocol [71] can be trivially instantiated in our
model (§4), and will serve as a baseline for comparison.
For evaluation we consider a variety of cryptocurrency met-
rics (§5). These include common metrics, namely coalition resis-
tance and tendency to encourage coalitions [37, 40, 76, 79]. We
introduce a new metric – external expenditure, measuring the
resources spent on PoW. Instead of the binary metric permis-
sioned/permiossionless (classical-consensus-protocols/Nakamoto-
Blockchain, respectively), we introduce a continuousmetric of per-
missiveness, describing the cost of entrance to the system. Finally,
we tease apart the common safety-violation security metric into
two.We observe that such attacks in classical PoW systems require
high resource investment from the attacker, however, once success-
ful, completely refund their costs. We therefore consider this type
of attacks, as well as sabotage where the attacker is not refunded.
HEB, achieves similar security properties to classical PoW, but
with lower external expenditure (§6). It operates similarly to a clas-
sical PoW protocol, but enables miners to spend system coins in
a specific, internal manner as part of the mining process. Miners
who do so increase their rewards, resulting with this being a Nash-
equilibrium. This incentivizes miners to spend a portion of their re-
sources internally, keeping the total mining expenses at the same
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level as classical PoW while reducing the external ones. Maintain-
ing high block creation costs keeps the required high attack re-
source investment. The internally-spent coins are redistributed us-
ing a novel redistribution technique, which might be of indepen-
dent interest (e.g., for regulating transaction fees).
Note that naive adjustments of the cryptocurrency minting rate,
or alternatively, forcing miners to internally spend, are both not
effective. We briefly review trivial and non-trivial options in the
appendix (§A).
Analyzing HEB against our evaluation metrics shows how its
parameters affect the system properties (§7). We demonstrate how
HEB can achieve significantly lower electricity consumption, while
maintaining high safety-violation threshold against adversaries
who seek to increase their revenue rather than to sabotage the
system. Such adversaries are, conceivably, the main threat to cryp-
tocurrencies, whereas sabotage is less common due to the require-
ment for sustained effort and lack of direct motive [8, 27, 55].
We discuss several practical considerations for HEB (§8). These
include utilizing a pure PoW ramp-up period to create sufficient
currency circulation, and addressing discretization issues.
In summary, we make the following contributions:
• A model for PoW blockchains that relates internal and ex-
ternal currencies (§3);
• novel cryptocurrency evaluation metrics: external expen-
diture, (continuous) permissiveness level, and refundable
attack threshold (§5);
• HEB, a tunable hybrid-expenditure protocol (§6);
• an analysis showing HEB reduces external expenditure
without harming security against rational miners (§7); and
• solutions to practical implementation concerns (§8).
2 RELATED WORK
First proposed by Dwork and Naor [33], proof of work
schemes [54] originally aimed to increase the cost of attacks like
Spam email by requiring the attacker to expend resources for each
send. Aspnes et al. [6] suggests using moderately hard puzzles to
secure distributed consensus from Sybil attacks where an attacker
masquerades as multiple entities. Nakamoto [71] incorporated in-
centives into the PoW consensus by implementing a blockchain, an
economic system called the Bitcoin cryptocurrency. The incentives
allow the blockchain to automatically adjust the required work dif-
ficulty as a function of the number of participants. In Nakamoto’s
blockchain and all subsequent PoW protocols we are aware of, the
incentives equal the number of generated cryptocurrency coins
(and fees). We are not aware of previous work aiming to tune PoW
expenditure in cryptocurrencies – the main focus of this work. In
the rest of this section we survey the significant body of work in-
troducing PoW-based consensus alternatives (§2.1) and analyses of
current PoW systems (§2.2).
2.1 PoW Alternatives
Permissioned systems. These systems assume a set of entities
that run a Byzantine fault tolerant [9, 21, 50, 56, 61, 81] algorithm
to determine system state, and are also in charge of making mem-
bership changes. Unlike HEB, these systems are permissioned, as
new participants require the authorization of existing users to join.
Such solutions are common in the enterprise market [9, 19], but are
not directly suitable for permissionless cryptocurrency systems.
Proof of stake. An alternative approach is PoS, used by systems
like Algorand [59] andOuroboros [46]. To allow users to join freely
while still averting Sybil-attacks [32], these systems limit partici-
pation to users with stake in the system, i.e., users who own to-
kens. The Sybil-deterrence mechanism is the cost to acquire these
tokens, and as in the previous approach, the stakeholders run an
agreement protocol to determine the system state.
These systems are designed and analyzed under different as-
sumptions from PoW. Their security is measured with respect to
the amount of owned tokens rather than expended resources. They
assume a new participant wanting to join the system can acquire
as many system tokens as she desires, and is only limited by her
own budget constraints. Some PoS systems assume users volun-
tarily delete deprecated data [59] or assume clients remain online
for extended periods [46]. In contrast, our model uses the PoW as-
sumptions.
Proof of activity. Bentov et al. [11] propose a system utilizing
PoW to elect a committee of participants among the system stake-
holders, who then run a variation of a classical permissioned dis-
tributed consensus protocol. Similarly to Algorand [46], they also
make assumptions regarding the availability of stake holders to
ensure system progress. HEB does not require assumptions of that
sort since its blocks can be generated without tokens.
Proof of useful work. This approach suggests performing useful
work for PoW, that is, work that has external value outside the
security of the cryptocurrency system [7, 84]. However, these pro-
tocols also operate under different assumptions. Ball et al. [7] relies
on users providing problem instances altruistically, while Zhang et
al. [82] rely on trusted hardware, i.e., a manufacturer like Intel.
In this work we focus on reduction of wastefulness rather than
its re-purposing, without relying on a centralized authority nor
assuming altruistic behavior.
Proof of burn. A different suggestion for PoW replacement
is proof-of-burn [58, 73, 78], in which miners prove the depletion
of another cryptocurrency, typically PoW-based, to create blocks.
This scheme replaces burning electricity with burning another cur-
rency. This increases the scarcity of the burnt coins, and hence that
currency’s value, maintaining high minting costs and negative en-
vironmental impact. In contrast, HEB reduces the expended exter-
nal resources without deferring the waste.
Proof of space. Permacoin [70] and MeshCash [10] both use stor-
age instead of computations as basis for their puzzles. However,
this approach still results with physical resource expenditure. HEB
reduces any external expenditure, and can be applied to such sys-
tems as well.
2.2 PoW Analysis
Previous work also focuses on incentive compatibility analysis of
classical PoW systems [20, 38, 40, 45, 52, 64, 65, 72, 76, 79, 84]. It
models miners as players in a game striving to maximize their rev-
enue, and analyzes the optimality of various mining strategies. We
apply similar techniques in the analysis of HEB.
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Chen et al. [22] define properties of reward allocation rules in a
PoW system. Their work focuses on proofs for a family of reward
allocation rules for a single block, and does not consider environ-
mental impact nor malicious agents. We note that HEB protocol’s
reward allocation rule matches their presented axioms.
3 MODEL
We now present a model for an abstract blockchain system, in-
stantiated with a cryptocurrency protocol. We clearly distinguish
the two, allowing us to consider different cryptocurrency instanti-
ations.
We begin by presenting the blockchain, the participating enti-
ties and how the system derives its state (§3.1). We then define how
a cryptocurrency protocol instantiates that system, defining an in-
ternal system currency based on the blockchain (§3.2). We follow
by formalizing the economic relation of the internal currency with
an external one serving as a reference point (§3.3), and present how
the system makes progress (§3.4). We conclude by formalizing the
cryptocurrency system as a game, to be used in our game-theoretic
analysis (§3.5).
3.1 Blockchain and System Principals
The system comprises a shared global storage SG , a scheduler, prin-
cipals maintaining the system named agents, and system users
called clients.
Global storage. The global storage is an append-only set con-
taining elements called blocks. Each block includes a reference to
another block and data generated by system clients, with the only
exception being a so-called genesis block. The global storage SG
initially contains only the genesis block. Hence, blocks define a
directed tree data structure.
We refer to paths in the data structure starting with the genesis
block and ending at a leaf block as chains. We denote for any chain
C its last block and length as last (C) and length (C), respectively.
We divide a chain C to epochs of ℓ blocks. For any k ∈ N, epoch k
includes the series of blocks [ℓk + 1, ℓ (k + 1)] in C .
Let there be the function LC
(
SG
)
, returning an arbitrarily-yet-
deterministically ordered list of the longest chains in SG .
Also let there be the function LMP
(
SG
)
, returning the longest
mutual prefix of the longest chains in SG . Note that if there is a
single longest chain
(LC (SG ) = 1) then that chain is also the
longest mutual prefix chain, and in such scenario we refer to it
as the main chain.
Agents and scheduler. We assume that agents and clients are
static during an epoch execution, that is, do not change during the
course of an epoch. Denote Agents (k) and Clients (k) the agents
and clients of epoch k , respectively.
Each agent i has a local storage SLi accessible only to her. Like
the SG , it is also an append-only block set.
The scheduler invokes agents, allowing them to create blocks in
their local storage, and to publish their local blocks (i.e., copy them
to SG ). We denote N ki (C) the number of blocks in epoch k created
by agent i on chain C .
State. The system implements a state machine, and agents and
clients derive the state by parsing the global storage SG , reading
the client-generated data according to the order of the blocks in
the main chain.
3.2 Instantiating Cryptocurrency Protocol
The system is instantiated with a cryptocurrency protocol Π . It
defines a currency internal to the system, ic (e.g., Bitcoin [71] and
Ether [17]), and maps all of its coins to agents and clients through
a function Bal (C), taking as input a chain C .
Specifically, for any agent or client i and chain C the function
Bal (C) returns a value in R≥0, which we say is her cryptocur-
rency possession in ic. The total number of coins in the system is
the sum of all agent and client possessions.
The protocolΠ defines the minting of new ic at the end of epoch
k , i.e., how new coins added to the system.
We say the protocol mints ℓrk new coins in epoch k . Denote by
cj the total number of coins in the system when length (C) = j. For
any i ∈ [0, ℓ − 1] it holds that cℓk+i = cℓk , and that cℓ(k+1) −cℓk =
ℓrk . Note that Bal (C) also indicates how the new ℓrk coins are
distributed among the agents and clients.
Note. To avoid temporal inconsistencies protocols often make
newly-minted coins available only after sufficiently many other
blocks are created. For example, Bitcoin [71] makes coins minted in
block x available only after block x + 100. We neglect such mecha-
nisms for simplicity, but they demonstrate that delayed availability
of minted coins is practical.
3.3 Cryptocurrency Economics
External currency. Let there be some external currency ec (e.g.,
EUR, USD, RMB). We assume the external currency has a mar-
ket capital order of magnitudes larger than that of the cryptocur-
rency [41], and it effectively represents real values.
Equation of exchange. We model the cryptocurrency as an
ecosystem abiding the equation of exchange [16, 18, 69], detailing
the relation of a currency’s supply with price level. Specifically, let
M be the system’s currency supply, or the total number of coins
available; let V be the velocity of a single coin, meaning the aver-
age number of times a coin is traded during a certain time period;
let P be the price level of the coin, which is the inverse of its mon-
etary value in ec; and let T be the transaction volume during a
certain period. The equation of exchange states thatM ×V = P ×T .
The transacted volume (T ) and coin velocity (V ) are affected by
the system’s adoption, usability, related legislation, and other con-
siderations outside the scope of this work [13, 15, 24, 51, 62, 80].
Hence, throughout the rest of this work, when comparing two
different cryptocurrency ecosystems, we assume they share the
same values of T and V . That is, let there be two cryptocurrency
ecosystems with respective M1,M2 currency supplies and P1, P2
respective price levels. Therefore, we assume M1P1 =
T
V =
M2
P2
. It im-
mediately follows that if two ecosystems have the same currency
supply (M1 = M2) then the price levels of their respective coins are
equal, P1 = P2.
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Exchange. We assume there is an instantaneous, commission-
free, and unlimited exchange service of ec and ic, where the ex-
change rate is in accordance with the equation of exchange. For
simplicity we normalize the price level, and thus the exchange rate,
to be exactly 1.We often sum ec and ic, considering the sum of their
values in real terms.
Agent economy. Aside from their ic possessions, agents also own
ec.We use the terms internal and external budgets to distinguish the
different currency holdings, and simply budget to describe their
accumulated value.
Our analysis focuses on budget expended for maintaining the
system. Therefore, if an entity spends only a portion of its budget
on system maintenance we consider it to be two separate entities,
an agent that spends that amount, and a client that holds the rest.
That is, agents spend their entire budget per epoch.
For any epoch k we denote by Beci (k) and B
ic
i (k) the external
and internal currency value of each agent i ∈ Agents (k), bothmea-
sured in ec, respectively. The budget of each agent i is therefore
Bi (k) , B
ec
i (k) + B
ic
i (k).
We denote the accumulated value of internal and external
currency all agents own, BicAgents (k) ,
∑
j∈Agents B
ic
j (k) and
BecAgents (k) ,
∑
j∈Agents B
ec
j (k), respectively.
We also denote the budgets of all agents
BAgents (k) , B
ic
Agents (k) + B
ec
Agents (k) and all clients B
ic
Clients
(k).
We denote the relative budget of agent i as bi (k) ,
Bi (k)
BAgents(k)
.
Similarly, we denote the external and internal relative budgets of
agent i as beci (k) ,
Beci (k)
BecAgents(k)
and b ici (k) ,
Bici (k)
BicAgents(k)
, respectively.
Budget proportions. We assume that the value of spent resources
by the agents on the system maintenance in a single epoch k is
much smaller than the total value of cryptocurrency it facilitates.
That is, the budget of all agents is negligible compared to that of
all clients, i.e., BAgents (k) ≪ B
ic
Clients (k).
Note. This assumption holds in Bitcoin (where ℓ = 1) and the
ratio
BAgents(k)
BicClients(k)
is about 12.518M = 7 · 10
−7 [25], and in Ethereum where
it is 6109.2M = 5.5 · 10
−8 [26].
3.4 Execution
Initially the global storage SG contains only the genesis block, and
each agent i has an empty local storage SLi = ∅. The state variables
(like the global and local storages) change over time, but we omit
indexing as it is clear from the context.
The system progresses in epochs of the longest mutual prefix
chain LMP
(
SG
)
, orchestrated by the scheduler (Alg. 1).
Epochk begins when length
(
LMP
(
SG
) )
= ℓk . First, nature sets
all agent budgets (line 1).
Then the scheduler lets agents exchange their owned inter-
nal and external currency using the exchange service, achieving
their preferred balance of the two resource types. We use the
term allocate to describe this action, and say agent i allocates
her budget Bi (k) with the invocation of the Allocatei
(
SG ,Bi (k)
)
function, returning a tuple of her set internal and exter-
nal budgets
〈
Bici (k) ,B
ec
i (k)
〉
. That is, the scheduler invokes
Allocatei
(
SG ,Bi (k)
)
for each agent i (lines 3 – 4).
The rest of the epoch execution progresses in steps, until longest
mutual prefix chain is extended by ℓ blocks (lines 5 – 14). Each
step begins with the scheduler selecting a single agent at ran-
dom, proportionally to her relative external expenditure, that is
∀i ∈ Agents : Pr (scheduler selects i) = beci (k) (line 6). This rep-
resents a standard PoW mechanism.
The scheduler invokes the selected agent i’s function
Generate
Π
i
(
SG , SLi
)
, returning a newly generated block. The
cryptocurrency protocol Π states validity rules of which blocks
must abide. Invalid blocks do not affect the system state. Creating
an invalid block or not generating one at all is unproductive and
we consider agents who avoid doing so. The scheduler adds the
returned block to agent i’s local storage SLi (line 7).
Finally, the scheduler lets all agents publish their local blocks by
invoking Publish
(
SG , SL
)
, returning a subset of her previously-
private local blocks for publication. The scheduler adds the re-
turned blocks to the global storage, and repeats this process until
all agents do not wish to publish any more blocks (lines 7 – 14).
Note. Similarly to previous work [5, 40], the model steps repre-
sent logical state changes, and not time-based steps [44, 59]. Block
publication includes the publication loop (lines 9 – 14) to facilitate
strategic-block-release behaviors [40, 72, 76]. Like prior work [40, 72,
76], our model assumes synchronous access to the global storage.
The cryptocurrency protocol Π states prescribed implementa-
tions for any agent i of Allocatei
(
SG ,Bi (k)
)
,GenerateΠi
(
SG , SLi
)
,
and Publishi
(
SG , SLi
)
, which we refer to as the prescribed strat-
egy and denote as σΠprescribed. The protocol Π is therefore a tu-
ple of the balance function and its prescribed strategy Π =〈
BalΠ
(
LMP
(
SG
))
,σΠ
prescribed
〉
.
Note that Π cannot force agents to follow σprescribed, and each
agent may choose her own function implementations.
3.5 Block Creation as a Game
The model gives rise to a game, played for the duration of a single
epoch. The players are the agents, each with a present budget.
We define the utility of player i for an epoch k as
her expected cryptocurrency holdings at the conclusion
of said epoch (i.e., when length
(
LMP
(
SG
))
= ℓ (k + 1)):
ExpInci (k) , E
[
Bali
(
LMP
(
SG
))]
.
As commonly done in the analysis of cryptocurrency protocols
we assume during an epoch the system is in a quasi-static state,
where all players participate and the total profit is 0 [20, 40, 49, 53,
79]. In running systems miners participate for a positive profit, but
discussing the required return-on-investment ratio for such behav-
ior is out the scope of this work. Accordingly, the sum of all agent
expected incomes equals the overall agent budgets, that is
BAgents (k) =
∑
i ∈Agents(k)
ExpInci (k) . (1)
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Algorithm 1: Scheduler in epoch k
/* Initial storage state */
input :SG such that length
(
LMP
(
SG
) )
= ℓk
/* Budget distribution */
1 for i ∈ Agents (k ) do
2 Bi (k ) ← v ∈ R≥0 , chosen by nature such that BAgents (k ) ≪ B
ic
Clients (k )
/* Allocate */
3 for i ∈ Agents (k ) do
4
〈
Bic
i
(k ) , Bec
i
(k )
〉
← Allocatei
(
SG , B
i
(k )
)
/* Extention */
5 while length
(
LMP
(
SG
) )
< ℓ (k + 1) do
// Generation
6 i ← agent index chosen at random, ∀j ∈ Agents (k ) : Pr (i = j ) = bec
j
(k )
7 SLi ← S
L
i ∪
{
Generate
Π
i
(
SG , SLi
)}
// Publication
8 blocks_to_publish ← ∅
9 do
10 SG ← SG ∪ blocks_to_publish
11 blocks_to_publish ← ∅
12 for i ∈ Agents (k ) do
13 blocks_to_publish ← blocks_to_publish ∪ Publishi
(
SG , SLi
)
14 while blocks_to_publish , ∅
We normalize the number of newly-minted coins in epochk per
block to be 1, that is rk = 1.
The player strategy space includes choosing the budget alloca-
tion ratio, what blocks to generate, and when to publish them, i.e.,
implementations of Allocate
(
SG ,B (k)
)
, GenerateΠ
(
SG , SL
)
and
Publish
(
SG , SL
)
.
4 NAKAMOTO PROTOCOL
To make those definitions concrete, we now instantiate an epoch-
based Nakamoto blockchain protocol like Bitcoin [71], simply de-
noted Nakamoto, in our model. Note that specifically Bitcoin uti-
lizes a single-block epochs (ℓ = 1).
This definition both exemplifies our model and serves as a
basis for comparison with other protocols. The balance func-
tion of Nakamoto awards each agent i with a relative reward
equal to her relative contributed blocks in the epoch. Hence,
the balance of each agent i with the conclusion of the epoch is
BalNakamotoi
(
LMP
(
SG
))
=
Ni (LMP(SG ))∑
j∈Agents Nj (LMP(SG ))
ℓ coins, and the to-
tal number of minted coins in the epoch is exactly ℓ.
The prescribed strategy σNakamotoprescribed (Alg. 2) states that each agent
i allocates her budget Beci = Bi and B
ic
i = 0, points created blocks
to last
(
LC
(
SG
))
, and publishes them immediately. In case of con-
flicting longest chains, σNakamoto
prescribed
states that the agent points her
next block to either of them picked uniformly-at-random.
Note. Bitcoin [71] defines a different tie-breaking rule — pick the
first chain that the agent became aware of. That variation assures dif-
ferent security guarantees based on the underlying network assump-
tions. As in previous work [39, 60], we avoid such assumptions by
considering the uniformly-at-random variation.
Algorithm 2: σNakamotoi,prescribed
1 Function Allocate(SG , B
i
):
2 return
〈
0, Bi
〉
3 Function Generate(SG , SL
i
):
4 C ← uniformly at random from LC
(
SG
)
5 pointer ← last (C )
6 return NewBlock(pointer)
7 Function Publish(SG , SL
i
):
8 return All previously unpublished blocks
Assume all agents follow σNakamotoprescribed . Then there is a single
longest chain
(LC (SG ) = 1) that is also its longest mutual pre-
fix, which we denote as C = LMP
(
SG
)
.
We note the scheduler picks at each step an agent proportionally
to their relative external budgets (Alg.1, line6). We can consider
each pick as a Bernoulli trial where agent i is picked with success
probability of bi . So, the number of blocks an agent i creates in an
epoch is binomially distributed Ni (C) ∼ Bin
(
ℓ,bi
)
, and therefore
E [Ni (C)] = ℓb
ec
i .
The expected income of agent i is
ExpIncNakamotoi = b
ec
i ℓ , (2)
matching previous analysis [71].
Summing for all agents and applying the budget-income equa-
tion (Eq. 1) yields BAgents = B
ec
Agents = ℓ, and the cost to create each
block is exactly 1.
5 CRYPTOCURRENCY EVALUATION
METRICS
Different PoW protocols with their prescribed mining strategies
offer different properties, and when comparing such two protocols
one needs to carefully define the comparison criteria. This section
defines evaluation metrics for PoW cryptocurrency protocols.
We begin by formalizing previous metrics [4, 22, 38, 40, 45, 64,
65, 72, 74, 76, 79, 84] regarding the incentive compatibility of a sys-
tem, that is, the alignment of rational and intended mining strate-
gies. We define Size bias, measuring disproportions in the reward
distribution (§5.1), and Nash threshold, an upper bound on a min-
ing coalition’s relative budget for which the prescribed strategy
σΠprescribed is Nash-equilibrium (§5.2).
We also refine the common safety-violation security metric [14,
55, 57, 68, 75], discussing the cost of attack. We identify such at-
tacks, once successful, refund themselves, and hence consider the
budget threshold instead of cost. We consider two specifics vari-
ants. The first, Free safety-violation threshold, measures the bud-
get threshold for such a refundable attack (§5.3). The second,
Safety-violation threshold, is similar butwithout the refund require-
ment.
We then move to introduce new metrics. Previous work [9, 71]
often considered either fully-permissioned or fully-permissionless
systems, where the former (latter) required full (no) permission
of existing participants to allow new users to join. We generalize
this binary differentiation to a continuous metric, Permissiveness,
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evaluating the revenue of a new system user that lacks permission
of the current users (§5.5).
We define External expenses to contrast environmental impact
among cryptocurrency protocols, measuring the total external ex-
penses in ec of a single epoch (§5.6).
5.1 Size bias
The security of cryptocurrency systems relies on the assumption
that there are multiple independent agents that none of them has
substantial control over the system. For that, these systems strive
to distribute their rewards in a way that is size-indifferent, meaning
that agents get relative reward matching their relative budgets.
The metric Size bias measures how a protocol satisfies this
desideratum, and unlike the other metrics, is evaluated per a spe-
cific budget distribution.
Formally, assume for a budget distribution where each agent
i with relative budget bi follows σ
Π
prescribed
. The expected income
of such player is ExpIncΠi , and we denote the distance of relative
budget and relative income as δi ,
bi − ExpIncΠi∑
j∈Agents ExpInc
Π
j
. We then
define Size bias , max
i ∈Agents
δi .
We want Size bias to be minimal, as higher values indicate
agents get disproportional share. Preferably, Size bias = 0, indi-
cating all agents get reward proportionally to their budget.
Example 5.1. In Nakamoto protocol we get ExpIncNakamotoi =
beci ℓ (Eq. 2), and as such
ExpIncNakamotoi∑
j∈Agents ExpInc
Nakamoto
j
= bi . It follows that
Size bias = 0, as also shown in [71].
5.2 Nash threshold
Recall protocol Π provides a prescribed strategy σΠ
prescribed
that
agents individually choose whether to follow or not. The metric
Nash threshold bounds from above the required relative budget bi
of an agent i such that σΠ
prescribed
is Nash-equilibrium.
Formally, let σΠi,best denote the best-response strategy of agent
i with relative budget bi when all other agents follow σ
Π
prescribed
.
Nash threshold is themaximal valuebi such that σ
Π
i,best = σ
Π
prescribed.
It follows that σΠ
prescribed
is a Nash-equilibrium if all agent rela-
tive budgets are not greater than Nash threshold.
Example 5.2. Sapirshtein et al. [76] showed that for Nakamoto
the value of Nash threshold depends on network assumptions.
When applying the uniform tie-breaking fork selection rule, it re-
sults with Nash threshold = 0.232.
5.3 Free safety-violation threshold
We consider safety-violation attacks as scenarios where an at-
tacker intentionally leads the system to an alternative, conflicting
state. This can be achieved by creating and publishing an alterna-
tive chain, surpassing in length themain one, and by thus replacing
it. The blocks on the original chain are then discarded, and the sys-
tem state is reinstated according to the blocks on the alternative,
new chain.
To mount this attack in Nakamoto the attacker expends her re-
sources on creating blocks to form the alternative chain, and recall
that each block costs its worth in reward to create (Eq. 1). There-
fore, if the attack is successful, the attacker is fully compensated for
her expenditures by the rewards from her created blocks. As such,
there is a threshold of required resources to mount this attack, but
once met, the attack bares no costs, that is, free.
The metric Free safety-violation thresholdmeasures the minimal
required budget (in ec) for an agent to deploy such a self-sustaining
safety-violation attack on the system, assuming all other agents
follow the prescribed strategy σΠprescribed. As shown in previous
work [14], the attackermay rent vast computational resources for a
short period of time or a moderate amount for longer periods [14].
We therefore measure the expected cost to create a single block,
disregarding the attack duration and amplitude.
Formally, assume all agents follow σΠ
prescribed
.
Free safety-violation threshold is the minimal cost to create a
block, guaranteeing full compensation should it be on the main
chain.
Example 5.3. In Nakamoto the cost to create each block is 1 ec,
hence Free safety-violation threshold = 1.
5.4 Safety-violation threshold
The metric Safety-violation threshold highly resembles
Free safety-violation threshold, but differs regarding the re-
quirement for compensation via the block reward. That is,
Safety-violation threshold is the cost to create a block without
requiring a complete refund through its reward.
Formally, assume all agents follow σΠprescribed.
Safety-violation threshold is the minimal cost to create a block,
without any further compensation guarantees.
Example 5.4. In Nakamoto all blocks produce the same reward,
hence an agent cannot reduce the cost for a safety-violation
attack by choosing to create less-rewarding blocks. Therefore,
Safety-violation threshold = 1.
We note such attacks are, conceivably, uncommon due to the
requirement for sustained effort and lack of direct motive, espe-
cially compared to the more sensible, self-sustaining alternative
version [8, 27, 55].
5.5 Permissiveness
Cryptocurrency protocols implement their own reward distribu-
tion mechanisms
(
i.e., Bal
(
LMP
(
SG
)))
, and may choose to condi-
tion rewards on an agent having the internal system currency ic.
For example, in PoS systems [34, 46, 59] owning ic is a requisite,
and failure to obtain ic prevents participation, and consequently,
rewards. In contrast, in PoW systems [17, 71] owning ic does not
affect reward eligibility.
Note that acquiring ic requires updating the new currency own-
ership in the system state, which requires authorization of the
present system agents. Therefore, a new agent that wishes to own
ic and participate in the system requires, in some extent, the per-
mission of existing agents. If these agents refuse to authorize (e.g.,
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to prevent future competition) the currency ownership of the new
agent then she might suffer decreases revenues (in PoS, no reward).
The Permissiveness metric measures the revenue ratio of an
agent comparing the scenarios where she failed or managed to ob-
tain ic. We illustrate such failures through the allocation function,
as details below.
Formally, assume an agent i with budget Bi , and that all other
agents follow σΠ
prescribed
. Denote σΠ
prescribed-no-ic
as a strategy identi-
cal to σΠ
prescribed
with the exception that the Allocatei
(
SG ,Bi (k)
)
implementation returns
〈
0,Bi
〉
. Denote ExpIncΠ
i,prescribed-no-ic
and
ExpIncΠ
i,prescribed
the expected income of agent i if she fol-
lows σΠprescribed-no-ic and σ
Π
prescribed, respectively. We then define
Permissiveness ,
ExpIncΠ
i,prescribed-no-ic
ExpIncΠ
i,prescribed
.
Permissiveness = 1 means an agent’s expected income is not af-
fected by her inability to obtain ic, meaning the protocol achieves
its permissionless objective. In contrast, Permissiveness = 0 indi-
cates that an agent who cannot obtain ic is completely prevented
from participation.
Example 5.5. Nakamoto does not require internal expenditure,
and both strategies do not allocate any budget internally, and as
such Permissiveness = 1.
5.6 External expenses
External expenses evaluates the external expenditure of the proto-
col, and lower values indicate a lower environmental impact.
Formally, assume all agents follow σΠprescribed. External expenses
is the total of agent external expenses, measured in ec, normalized
by the epoch length, i.e, External expenses ,
BecAgents
ℓ
.
Example 5.6. InNakamoto the total agent expenses areBecAgents =
ℓ and as such External expenses = 1.
6 HEB PROTOCOL
We now present HEB, our tunable protocol designed to be less
wasteful than classical PoW protocols. It reduces electricity con-
sumption by requiring substituting external by internal expenses
to produce blocks.
Briefly, HEB incentivizes agents to expend their budgets inter-
nally by enabling agents who do so to create higher-rewarding
blocks. We detail the different block types, the reward distribution
mechanism, and the prescribed strategy.
The protocol includes two parameters , ρ ∈ [0, 1) and F ∈ R>1,
both affecting the way agents create blocks, as detailed below.
Block types. HEB includes two types of blocks, regular and fac-
tored. Each block has a type, determined at its creation.
During the epoch agent i can create regular blocks at will (i.e.,
when the scheduler invokesGenerate()). In contrast, creating a fac-
tored block onC requires an expenditure of ρ in ic by agent i at the
start of the epoch. Note that agent i can therefore create at most⌊
Bici
ρ
⌋
factored blocks in an epoch on chain C .
Algorithm 3: σHEBi,prescribed
1 Function Allocate(SG , Bi ):
2 return
〈
ρB
i
, (1 − ρ) B
i
〉
3 Function Generate(SG , SLi ):
4 C ← uniformly at random from LC
(
SG
)
5 pointer ← last (C )
6 if Ni (C ) <
⌊
Bic
i
ρ
⌋
then
7 type ← factored
8 else
9 type ← regular
10 return NewBlock(pointer, type)
11 Function Publish(SG , SL
i
):
12 return All previously unpublished blocks
HEB assigns a weight to each block according to its type, and
factored and regular blocks have weights of F and 1, respectively.
Reward distribution. HEB distributes the ℓ minted coins among
the agents proportionally to their contributed block weights.
Denote byWi (C) the total weight of blocks created in the epoch
by agent i on chain C . So, agent i gets
Wi (LMP(SG ))∑
j∈AgentsWj (LMP(SG ))
ℓ coins
due to her contributed blocks.
HEB distributes the internal expenses BicAgents among all system
participants proportionally to their ic possessions at the epoch be-
ginning. So, agent i receives
Bici
BicAgents+B
ic
Clients
BicAgents coins due to the
redistribution.
Therefore, the balance of agent i with the epoch con-
clusion is BalHEBi
(
LMP
(
SG
))
=
Wi (LMP(SG ))∑
j∈AgentsWj (LMP(SG ))
ℓ +
Bici
BicAgents+B
ic
Clients
BicAgents.
Prescribed strategy. The prescribed strategy σHEBprescribed (Alg. 3)
states that agents should try to create all their blocks as factored.
That is, agents allocate their budget with ratio of ρ, and create fac-
tored blocks up to their internal-expenditure limitation.
Formally, agent i allocates s.t. Bici = ρBi and B
ec
i = (1 − ρ)Bi .
She also creates her first
⌊
Bici
ρ
⌋
blocks as factored.
Similarly to previous prescribed strategies, agent i points her
created blocks to a uniformly-at-random selected chain from
LC
(
SG
)
, and publishes them immediately.
Note. Setting ρ = 0 enables agents to create all blocks as factored,
and setting F = 1 removes motivation to create any factored blocks at
all. That is, both of these parameter choices result in protocols where
there is only one practical block type, reducing HEB to a Nakamoto-
like protocol.
7 ANALYSIS
Wenow evaluateHEBwith respect to the presented evaluationmet-
rics. We begin with an analysis of the prescribed strategy, deriving
agents’ expected income and expenses (§7.1).
We move to evaluate Size bias, showing it HEB can be tuned to
achieve Size bias = 0 by selecting sufficiently long epochs (§7.2).
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We then consider Nash threshold (§7.3). We begin by searching
through the possible strategy space usingMarkov Decision Process,
showing how higher F and lower ρ values improve Nash threshold.
We also present a specific strategy, deriving a closed-form upper
bound for Nash threshold.
We proceed to show that Free safety-violation threshold =
1 (§7.4) and Safety-violation threshold = 1 − ρ (§7.5). Then we
show that lower F values improve Permissiveness (§7.6), and that
External expenses = 1 − ρ (§7.7). We conclude with a summary of
parameter effects on HEB’s evaluation (§7.8).
7.1 Prescribed strategy
Some of the metrics evaluate the protocol when all agents follow
the prescribed strategy, a scenario we analyze in this section. We
show that ExpIncHEBi =
E[Wi (C)]∑
j∈Agents E[Wj (C )]
ℓ, BAgents = ℓ and a single
block’s creation cost is 1.
This analysis requires the following steps. First we show the
redistributed internal currency an agent receives is negligible, al-
lowing us to focus on the minting reward. For that we analyze the
number of blocks an agent finds. Then, we derive her conditional
total block weight, that is, her total block weight conditioned on
the number of blocks she finds. We proceed to derive her expected
total blockweight, and conclude with finding her expected income.
Note that as all agents follow σHEBprescribed there is a single longest
chain C .
Negligible internal distribution rewards. According to σHEB
prescribed
each agent i allocates her budget such that Bici = ρBi . Summing
the reward all agents receive and substituting total rewards with
total budget (Eq. 1) yields BAgents = ℓ+
(ρBAgents)
2
ρBAgents+B
ic
Clients
, and as such
BAgents
(
1 −
ρ2BAgents
ρBAgents+B
ic
Clients
)
= ℓ. Recall that ρ < 1 and BAgents ≪
Bic
Clients
, therefore ρ2BAgents ≪ B
ic
Clients
(cf. §3.3) and consequently
ρ2BAgents
ρBAgents+B
ic
Clients
is negligible. We get that BAgents = ℓ.
Number of blocks. Each agent i allocates such that Beci =
(1 − ρ)Bi and therefore the ec ratio of agent i equals her budget
ratio: beci =
Beci
BecAgents
=
(1−ρ )Bi
(1−ρ )BAgents
= bi .
Recall that the scheduler selects agent i to generate a block by
her relative external expenses, beci . Epochs are of length ℓ and the
number of blocks agent i creates in an epoch, Ni (C), is binomi-
ally distributed, that is Ni (C) ∼ Bin
(
ℓ,bi
)
. The probability that
agent i creates exactlym blocks in an epoch is Pr (Ni (C) =m) =( ℓ
m
)
·
(
bi
)m
·
(
1 − bi
)ℓ−m
, and her expected number of blocks is
E [Ni (C)] = ℓbi .
By σHEBprescribed each agent i allocates her budget such that B
ic
i =
ρBi . The required internal budget per factored block is ρ, so agent
i can create at most
⌊
Bi
⌋
factored blocks.
Recall Bi = bi ·BAgents and BAgents = ℓ, and we get the maximal
number of factored blocks agent i can create in an epoch is
⌊
ℓbi
⌋
.
For simplicity we assume that all agents have budgets such that
ℓbi ∈ N. We note this implies the minimal relative budget of an
agent to participate in the system. However, because ℓ is large, this
limitation only applies to agents with very low, arguably insignifi-
cant, relative budgets. E.g., if ℓ = 5000 then this limitation prevents
agents with lower than 0.0002 relative budget to participate, whom
are for any practical concern, irrelevant.
Note. The Chernoff bound [23] applies for Ni (C), stating an ex-
ponentially decreasing (with respect to ℓ) bound on its distribution
tail. For example, for an agent with relative budget b = 0.2 and
ℓ = 5000 it bounds the probability for a relative error of 10% by
0.008.
We now find the agent i’s total block weight, conditioned on the
number of blocks she created.
Conditional block weight. Assume agent i createdm blocks, and
recall she can create at most ℓbi factored ones.
If 0 ≤ m ≤ ℓ then agent i creates all her blocks as factored,
each contributing blockweight of F , resulting with an accumulated
block weight ofmF .
However, if ℓbi < m ≤ then agent i creates only ℓbi factored
blocks, while the rest,m − ℓbi are regular ones. Consequently, her
accumulated block weight is ℓbiF +m − ℓbi .
In summary, agent i’s block weight assuming she created
Ni (C) =m blocks is
Wi (C |Ni (C) =m) =
{
mF , 0 ≤ m ≤ ℓbi
ℓbiF +m − ℓbi ℓbi <m ≤ ℓ
. (3)
Expected block weight. It follows immediately the
expected block weight of agent i is E [Wi (C)] =∑ℓ
m=0 Pr (Ni (C) =m)Wi (C |Ni (C) =m).
Expected income. The expected income based on the Bal imple-
mentation is
ExpIncHEBi =
E [Wi (C)]∑
j∈Agents E
[
Wj (C)
] ℓ+ ρ2BiBAgents
ρBAgents + B
ic
Clients
. (4)
For similar considerations
ρ2BiBAgents
ρBAgents+B
ic
Clients
is negligible, resulting
with ExpIncHEBi =
E[Wi (C)]∑
j∈Agents E[Wj (C )]
ℓ.
With these results we move to evaluate HEB and σHEBprescribed.
7.2 Size bias
We now show that HEB achieves desirably low values of Size bias.
First, we prove that lim
ℓ→∞
Size bias = 0 (§7.2.1). That is, the sys-
tem designer improve Size bias by choosing a large ℓ value.
We then present the effects of other system parameters on
Size bias (§7.2.2). Specifically, we illustrate the effects of F and the
agent budget distribution. We quantify with numerical examples
and show that even for extreme cases HEB achieves low Size bias
values.
7.2.1 ℓ analysis. We now show that lim
ℓ→∞
Size bias = 0. We
define the normalized expected block weight of player i to be
nebwi ,
E[Wi (C)]
ℓb
i
F
. We present two lemmas, stating necessary
and sufficient conditions for Size bias to be 0.
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First, we show that iff all agents have the same normalized ex-
pected block weight and it is greater than 0, then Size bias = 0.
Lemma 7.1. Iff ∀i, j ∈ Agents : nebwi = nebwj , 0 then
Size bias = 0.
Proof. First, assume ∀i, j ∈ Agents : nebwi = nebwj , 0. It
follows ∀i ∈ Agents : E [Wi (C)] = nebw1 · ℓbiF . Therefore the
expected income of agent i is ExpIncHEBi =
nebw1 ·ℓbi F∑
j∈Agents nebw1 ·ℓbj F
ℓ =
bi ℓ. The relative expected income of agent i is
ExpIncHEBi∑
j∈Agents ExpInc
HEB
j
=
bi , so Size bias = 0.
Now assume Size bias = 0, meaning
ExpIncHEBi∑
j∈Agents ExpInc
HEB
j
= bi for
each agent i . Substituting in the expected income of an agent (Eq. 4,
omitting the negligible part) yields E[Wi (C )]∑
j∈Agents E[Wj (C )]
= bi .
Using E [Wi (C)] = nebwi · ℓbiF leads to
nebwi ·bi∑
j∈Agents nebwj ·bj
= bi
for each agent i . As E [Wi (C)] > 0 and bi > 0 then it immediately
follows that ∀i, j ∈ Agents : nebwi = nebwj , 0. 
Now we show that for a large ℓ value all agents have the same
normalized expected block weight of 1:
Lemma 7.2. For each agent i : lim
ℓ→∞
nebwi = 1 .
Proof. By the law of large numbers we get that Ni (C) con-
verges to its expected value, lim
ℓ→∞
Ni (C) = ℓbi . Consequently, the
expected block weight of each agent i (Eq. 3) is lim
ℓ→∞
E [Wi (C)] =
ℓbiF , and therefore lim
ℓ→∞
nebwi = 1. 
It directly follows that with a sufficiently large ℓ value (i.e., )
HEB achieves Size bias = 0. The next corollary, which follows im-
mediately, shows that HEB can be tuned to achieve Size bias = 0
by choosing sufficiently long epochs:
Corollary 7.3. lim
ℓ→∞
Size bias = 0.
7.2.2 Budget Distribution. We now evaluate the Size bias for
different values of ℓ, F and b . Note that as all agents follow
σHEBprescribed then Size bias is unaffected by ρ.
We proceed as follows. For various F and b values, we numer-
ically calculate and plot nebwi as a function of ℓ. We present our
results in Fig. 1. It presents for different F values how nebwi (verti-
cal axis) changes with ℓ (horizontal axis). The different plots show
different relative budgets of an agent i .
As expected (Lemma 7.2), for all F and bi values, nebwi ap-
proaches 1 as ℓ grows.
Fig. 1 also shows the effect of F value. When F = 1 the ex-
pected block weight of agent i is E [Wi (C)] = ℓbi , and as such
the normalized expected block weight is nebwi = 1 for any ℓ value
(Fig. 1a). However, for larger factor values (F > 1) we get that
nebwi < 1, with the difference being more significant for shorter
epochs (lower ℓ values) (Figs. 1b,1c).
That itself does not indicate an undesired value of Size bias, as
different agents may still have equal nebw values and the condi-
tions of Lemma 7.1 will still hold. However, we note that agents
with different relative budgets have different normalized expected
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Figure 1: nebwi values for different system parameters.
block weights, even for fixed epoch length ℓ and factor F val-
ues (Figs. 1b,1c).
We dedicate the rest of this section to analyze how different
budget distributions affect agent expected incomes and Size bias.
We consider various settings of at most 5 agents with epoch length
of ℓ = 5000 blocks and F = 20.
For each setting we numerically calculate Size bias and present
it, along with its respective budget distribution, in Table 1. We
choose these specific settings to demonstrate Size bias both with
high and low variance budget distributions.
Table 1 shows that more polarized budget distributions results
in higher Size bias. For instance, consider the setting with only two
agents where b1 = 0.2 and b2 = 0.8. That is, agent 2 has a budget
four times greater than that of agent 1 This setting leads to the
highest Size bias = 0.0013. Note that this is an unrealistic setting,
presented only as an example for a highly-uneven budget distribu-
tion. Even in that extreme scenario agent 1 has a degradation less
than 1% in her relative expected income. More balanced settings
lead to lower Size bias values.
In summary, even a highly-unbalanced budget distribution re-
sults in minor deviations from proportional reward distribution.
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Budget distribution
Size bias
b1 b2 b3 b4 b5
0.20 0.80 - - - 0.0013
0.20 0.40 0.40 - - 0.0007
0.05 0.15 0.20 0.20 0.40 0.0007
0.20 0.20 0.30 0.30 - 0.0003
0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.0000
Table 1: Budget distribution and Size biaswhen ℓ = 5000 and
F = 20. Hyphens represent agents not present in the config-
uration.
Increasing ℓ and decreasing F enables the system designer to re-
duce these deviations.
7.3 Nash threshold
We now evaluate the Nash threshold (§5.2) of HEB. That is, the
maximal relative budget of an agent i such that σHEB
prescribed
is Nash-
equilibrium.
RecallHEB generalizesNakamoto by introducing the internal ex-
penditure mechanism and block weights, both greatly increasing
the strategy and state spaces. We therefore construct aMarkov De-
cision Process (MDP) for HEB that produces agent i’s best-response
strategy σHEB
i,best
based on system parameters (§7.3.1). We search pa-
rameter values for which the best response strategy is the pre-
scribed one, meaning the latter is Nash-equilibrium. We show
that increasing F values and lowering ρ increases Nash threshold.
Specifically, setting ℓ = 10, F = 20 and ρ = 0.5 suffices to obtain
Nash threshold = 0.2.
We also present and analyze a specific strategy, named Brute
Force Mining (σHEB
brute
), by which an agent i tries to create all the
epoch blocks by herself, maximizing her reward (§7.3.2). Intu-
itively, agent i allocates all her budget externally and ignores
blocks published by other agents. We present a closed-form anal-
ysis for this strategy’s applicability, producing the upper bound
Nash threshold <
1−ρ
2−ρ .
7.3.1 MDP analysis. The strategy space is too large for a closed-
form solution, even for simpler protocols like Nakamoto [17, 71].
So, as commonly done [45, 52, 76, 84] we construct an MDP to
search for an agent’s best-response strategy in various scenarios.
We first outline the construction of an MDP to find the best-
response strategy of agent i . The details are deferred the appen-
dix (§B). We then analyze what parameters result with the pre-
scribed strategy σHEB
prescribed
being Nash-equilibrium.
MDP best-response strategy search. As commonly done [20, 40,
44, 45, 45, 64, 71, 72, 76, 79, 83] we analyze the system from the
perspective of a rational agent i with Bi , with all the other agents
modeled as a single agent with a budgetB¬i , following a prescribed
strategy.
Note that σHEBi,best is the optimal implementation of Allocate(),
Generate() and Publish() given both agent budgets and the system
parameters ℓ, F , ρ.
We search for these implementations in the following manner.
First, we consider Allocate() implementations that lets agent i cre-
ate a natural number of blocks. For each such implementation we
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Figure 2: Minimal required F for Nash threshold.
use an MDP to obtain the optimal implementation of Generate()
and Publish(). We let the agent play the yielded strategies for 5000
games each, declaring the most rewarding one as σHEBi,best .
Search results. We now look for parameter values for which the
prescribed strategy is Nash-equilibrium. We apply the aforemen-
tioned technique to find agent i’s best-response strategy for differ-
ent parameter values and different budgets. Note the state spaces
grows exponentially with ℓ (cf. §B). Therefore, similarly to previ-
ous work [45, 76], we limit the state space by excluding strategies
requiring longer, and thus less probable, sequences of events.
We fix ℓ = 10 and for various values of ρ,Bi ,B¬i we use binary-
search to find the minimal F ∈
[
1, 108
]
value such that σHEB
i,best
=
σHEB
prescribed
.
The results (Fig. 2) show lower ρ values require smaller F val-
ues to ensure σHEBi,best = σ
HEB
prescribed. We note that for bi = 0.2 the
required F values grow exponentially with ρ up to ρ = 0.5, and
from there even the maximal F value does not accommodate the
desired behavior. We note a similar behavior for bi = 0.1, growing
exponentially with ρ up to ρ = 0.7, being the maximal ρ that leads
to a σHEB
prescribed
being Nash-equilibrium.
We also note that lower bi requires lower F values, and specif-
ically, there is no F and ρ values for which the configuration of
bi = 0.3 achieved Nash-equilibrium. This is expected as the prof-
itability threshold for selfish-mining is bi = 0.232 [76], and indeed
the reported best-response strategies resembled selfish-mining.
We conclude that Nash threshold relies on ℓ, F and ρ, and we
can obtain Nash threshold = 0.2 even for ρ = 0.5 by setting F
appropriately.
7.3.2 Brute Force Mining. We conclude the analysis of
Nash threshold by presenting and analyzing the Brute Force
Mining strategy (σHEBi,brute), deriving a closed-form upper bound for
Nash threshold. We show a condition for σHEBi,brute to outperform
σHEB
i,prescribed
. When it holds, σHEB
i,prescribed
is not agent i’s best response
strategy, indicating the Nash threshold bound.
σHEBi,brute states that agent i allocates s.t.
〈
0,Bi
〉
, creates regular
blocks pointing to the last block in her local storage, and publishes
these blocks only after she has created ℓ of them (Alg. 6, §C).
Intuitively, agent i tries to maximize her block creation rate by
expending all her resources externally. She is not concerned about
creating factored blocks, as if she publishes her blocks they will
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.
constitute the main chain, thus her relative block weight and con-
sequently reward ratio will be 1. Note that σHEBbrute is not necessarily
an optimal strategy.
This strategy is applicable when agent i creates blocks at higher
rate than the rest of all other agents combined, i.e., Beci > B
ec
¬i . We
therefore seek the minimal bi satisfying that condition.
All other agents follow σHEBprescribed and as such B
ec
¬i = (1 − ρ)B¬i .
Consequently, the aforementioned inequality is equivalent to
Bi > (1 − ρ)B¬i . Recall that Bi +B¬i = ℓ and ℓbi = Bi , and we get
bi > (1 − ρ)
(
1 − bi
)
or bi >
1−ρ
2−ρ .
Fig. 3 shows this bound. If bi >
1−ρ
2−ρ , i.e., above the curve,
σHEBi,brute outperforms σ
HEB
prescribed, showing that σ
HEB
prescribed is not Nash-
equilibrium.
As expected, higher ρ values lower the bound, as now the agent
requires to surpass a smaller value of Bec¬i . This result correlates
with Nakamoto, as when ρ = 0 then
1−ρ
2−ρ = 0.5, yielding the estab-
lished 50% bound [3, 63, 71, 76].
Trivially, if bi >
1−ρ
2−ρ then agent i maximizes her reward by
following σHEB
brute
over σHEB
prescribed
, and we therefore conclude that
Nash threshold <
1−ρ
2−ρ .
7.4 Free safety-violation threshold
In equilibria the total external expenses are 1 − ρ of total budgets,
that is BecAgents = (1 − ρ)BAgents. As BAgents = ℓ it follows that the
required external expenses to (expectedly) create a single block is
1 − ρ.
As other agents create factored blocks, an agent also has to cre-
ate a factored block to be fully compensated for her expenses, re-
quiring additional spending of ρ in ic. Hence, the cost to create a
single block is 1, that is Free safety-violation threshold = 1.
7.5 Safety-violation threshold
As mentioned, the required external expenses to create a single
block is 1−ρ. As an agent can choose not to create factored blocks,
she bares no additional internal expenses for block creation. It fol-
lows that Safety-violation threshold = ρ.
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Figure 4: Permissiveness of HEB.
7.6 Permissiveness
We now evaluate the Permissiveness of HEB. The number of agents
and their budget distribution heavily affects the expected income
of players, and thus Permissiveness as well.
We consider a system with two agents i and ¬i , with bud-
gets Bi ,B¬i , respectively. Agent ¬i has access to ic and follows
σHEBprescribed.
If agent i can obtain ic then she follows σHEB
prescribed
, resulting with
ExpIncHEB
i,prescribed = ℓbi .
However, if she cannot obtain ic then agent i follows
σHEBprescribed-no-ic, thus allocating her budget B
ic
i = 0,B
ec
i = Bi . It fol-
lows that beci =
Bi
Bi+(1−ρ )B¬i
and bec¬i =
(1−ρ )B¬i
Bi+(1−ρ )B¬i
.
Agent i creates only regular blocks, with an expected number
of
Bi
Bi+(1−ρ )B¬i
, therefore her expected block weight is E [Wi ] =
ℓ
Bi
Bi+(1−ρ )B¬i
. Agent ¬i creates only factored blocks with an ex-
pected block weight of E [W¬i ] = ℓF
(1−ρ )B¬i
Bi+(1−ρ )B¬i
. We thus get that
ExpIncHEB
i,prescribed-no-ic
=
Bi
Bi+F B¬i
ℓ.
By definition it follows that Permissiveness = 1
bi+F (1−bi )
.
We present Permissiveness as a function of F in Fig. 4, for differ-
ent values of bi . It shows that higher factor values F lead to lower
values of Permissiveness, tending the system towards being permis-
sioned. It also shows that agents with higher relative budgets are
slightly less susceptible to these effects.
As expected, higher values of F increase the reward of creating
factored blocks, and failing to do so results in lower income. Higher
relative budget enables creating more blocks, decreasing the over-
all block weight of the other agents, increasing her income despite
the lack of ic.
Note. Although failure to obtain ic results with lower reward, it
still enables agents to get a hold of some ic, improving their situation
for the next epoch.
This is a significant difference from PoS systems, where an agent
cannot participate in the consensus without owning tokens in ad-
vance, even at the expense of suffering lower revenues.
7.7 External expenses
As agents follow σHEB
prescribed
then BecAgents = (1 − ρ)BAgents and
External expenses = 1 − ρ.
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7.8 Parameter effect summary
HEB presents several knobs for the system designer to tune, which
we summarize below.
Epoch length ℓ. Longer epochs improves Size bias, however, also
asserts that reward distributions occur after the systemmade more
progress.
Factored block weight F . Higher F values improve
Nash threshold at the expense of Permissiveness. However,
note that even poor Permissiveness can be circumvented in future
epochs at the cost of reduced reward in a single epoch.
Internal expenditure rate ρ. Higher values reduce the external
expenditures, which is the main goal of this work. However, anal-
ysis shows it makes the system less robust to rational agents and
(the uncommon) Safety-violation threshold attacks.
We move to present several practical considerations, helping to
realize HEB.
8 PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS
Choosing specific parameter values should be with respect to the
desired system properties. Each system has different goals, and we
emphasize that determining parameter values is outside the scope
of this work. We focus on presenting the available knobs and their
effects on system properties and evaluation.
However, we do suggest setting the following configuration:
ρ = 0.5, ℓ = 5000 and F = 20. This configuration signifi-
cantly reduces wastefulness while the prescribed strategy is Nash-
equilibrium with respect to against rational agents with up to 0.2
relative budget.
Throughout the rest of this section we address practical consid-
erations, helping with the realization of HEB.
Epoch durations. Longer epochs are mainly required to assure
that with high probability each agent gets to create her expected
number of blocks, and thus not underutilize her internally-spent
coins. However, these epochs impose longer payout intervals, less
appealing to miners.
We state that these intervals exist even in classical PoW systems
(e.g., 100 blocks maturity period in Bitcoin), but to allow shorter
epochs while not degrading expected utilization we suggest let-
ting underutilized expenses to be used in the following consecu-
tive epoch. That should significantly decrease potential underuti-
lization.
Circulating supply. HEB lets the agents spend their currency in-
ternally. That requires a sufficiently large circulating supply, both
enabling agents to spend as well as realizing the cryptocurrency
ecosystem.
We suggest to include a ramp up period, in which HEB performs
as a classical PoW protocol [71], allowing enough currency to ac-
cumulate and thus justifying the BAgents (k) ≪ B
ic
Clients (k) assump-
tion.
Internal expenditure. We suggest utilizing the cryptocurrency
transaction mechanism to let users internally expend their coins.
A specific implementation could be to let the agents transact
their coins to a null address, conceptually similar to proof-of-burn
schemes [73, 78].
Currency redistribution. Recall that HEB redistributes the
internally-spent currency among all the cryptocurrency holders,
proportionally to their relative holdings.
There are two issues at hand – first, how to divide the coins pro-
portionally (who gets what), and then, how to perform the actual
redistribution (associate users with their apportioned coins).
Recall these systems record user amounts, whether they are ac-
count [17] or UTXO [31, 66, 71, 77] based.
As such, system users know all relative coin holdings and there-
fore how to proportionally divide the required amount. We note
proportional distribution could require fragmenting the atomic
unit of the currency (i.e., 1 Satoshi in Bitcoin [71]), and suggest to
circumvent such scenarios by using pseudo-random tie breaking,
rewarding only one user with the atomic unit coin. We illustrate
through an example: say there are 10 users with the same coin
holdings, due to share 15 coins, that is, each due 1.5 coins. As such,
5 users selected at random will receive 2 coins, while the other
receive only 1.
For the actual redistribution coin-assignment task we suggest
updating user amounts to include their new possessions. Note this
update could be performed implicitly, that is, without including
explicit transactions in the blockchain.
9 CONCLUSION
We present HEB – a PoW protocol that allows its designer to tune
external resource expenditure. Our model allows to link the val-
ues of internal and external currencies, and we introduce evalu-
ation metrics including a blockchain’s resilience to sabotage and
revenue-seeking attacks and permissiveness on a continuous scale.
We explore the trade-offs in parameter choice and propose practi-
cal sweet-spot parameters.
Natural questions that arise from the discovery ofHEB are what
should the security target be for cryptocurrency protocols, should
the parameters be set dynamically, and can they be set internally
(as part of the protocol) or do they require external input.
Beyond the theoretical questions, HEB extends the design space
of operational systems to allow for more environment-friendly
PoW blockchain implementations.
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A NAIVE PROTOCOLS
We present three naive protocols and discuss their shortcomings.
The first protocol, namedNakamotoHalf, is exactly asNakamoto
excepts it mints new coins at half rate (§A.1). That is, r2 new
coins per block compared to r of Nakamoto. We show this pro-
tocol is as wasteful as Nakamoto, i.e., they both result with
External expenses = 1.
We then consider a different protocol, named PartialReward (PR),
that similarly to Nakamoto also mints r coins per block (§A.2).
However, for a parameter ρ ∈ [0, 1), it rewards only (1 − ρ) r
of these to the block-generating agent, and distributes the
other αr among all system agents and clients proportionally
to their current coin holdings. We show that PR is less waste-
ful than Nakamoto (External expenses = 1 − ρ compared to 1)
at the expense of less resiliency to free safety-violation attacks
(Free safety-violation threshold = 1 − ρ compared to 1).
We conclude with the Mandatory Internal Expenses (MIE)
protocol, which is just like Nakamoto, but requires agents to
internally-spend to create blocks (§A.3). Althrough providing
lower Free safety-violation threshold, this protocol undesirably pro-
vides Permissiveness = 0 on top of having an inherent liveness is-
sue.
A.1 NakamotoHalf
As mentioned, NakamotoHalf is just like Nakamoto that mint coins
at half rate. The prescribed mining strategy is identical (Alg. 2).
Recall the equation of exchange, stating that the price of a single
coin in ec is inverse to the number of circulating coins (cf. §3.3).
As such, when minting at half rate, the price of a single coin in
NakamotoHalf is exactly twice of of a coin inNakamoto. So, despite
an agent gets only r2 coins with each block, her reward in ec is as
of an equivalent agent in Nakamoto. As such, NakamotoHalf is just
as wasteful as Nakamoto, both providing External expenses = 1.
A.2 PartialReward
As previously stated, PR mints r coins per block as Nakamoto, but
distributes these minted coins differently. It gives (1 − ρ) r to the
agent who created the block, and the remaning αr are shared be-
tween the agents and clients proportionally to their coin holdings.
The prescribed mining strategy is as in Nakamoto (Alg. 2).
As both protocols mint at the same rate, their respective
coins have the same ec value (cf. §3.3). However, PR agents
get less reward ((1 − ρ) r compared to r ), hence incentivized to
spend less electricity in equilbrium (Eq. 1). As such, it provides
External expenses = 1 − ρ, achieving less wastefulness.
However, as reward for creating a block is now lower also
are the costs to create one, and as such, the system is less re-
silient to free safety-violation attacks. Specifically, it only provides
Free safety-violation threshold =
(1−ρ )
ℓ
compared to the original
Free safety-violation threshold = 1
ℓ
.
That is, PR reduces wastefulness at the expense of making the
system less resilient.
Algorithm 4: σMIEi,prescribed
1 Function Allocate(SG , Bi ):
2 return
〈
ρB
i
, (1 − ρ) B
i
〉
3 Function Generate(SG , SLi ):
4 C ← uniformly at random from LC
(
SG
)
5 pointer ← last (C )
6 return NewBlock(pointer)
7 Function Publish(SG , SLi ):
8 return All previously unpublished blocks
A.3 MIE
The motivation forMIE is to incorporate internal expenses as part
of the block creation process. Similarly to Nakamoto it mints ℓ
coins per epoch and distributes them among the agents based on
their relative block contributions to the main chain. It is parame-
terized by ρ ∈ [0, 1), and requires that for each block in the epoch
an agent i creates on LMP
(
SG
)
she must have expended ρ of ic at
the beginning of the epoch.
As in Nakamoto, the ℓ minted coins are shared among all agents
proportioanlly to their number of contributed epoch blocks on the
main chain LMP
(
SG
)
, i.e. agent i that created Ni
(
LMP
(
SG
) )
re-
ceives
Ni (LMP(SG ))∑
j∈Agents Nj (LMP(SG ))
ℓr = Ni
(
LMP
(
SG
) )
r .
MIE distributes the expended ic, i.e. BicAgents, among all sys-
tem participants based on their ic holdings at the epoch
beginning. Therefore, agent i with internal budget Bici gets
Bici
BicAgents+B
ic
Clients
BicAgents of these redistributed coins.
Therefore, the balance of each agent i is the sum of two el-
ements; the first is the minted currency allocated to that agent
based on her block contribution, and the second is her alloca-
tion of the internally-spent and distributed currency. That is,
BalMIEi
(
LMP
(
SG
) )
=
Ni (C )∑
j∈Agents Nj (C )
ℓr +
Bici
BicAgents+B
ic
Clients
BicAgents.
The prescribed strategy σMIE
prescribed
(Alg. 4) indicates that agent i
should allocate her budget s.t.
〈
ρBi , (1 − ρ)Bi
〉
, point her created
blocks to last
(
LC
(
SG
))
, and publish them immediately. In case of
conflicting longest chains, σNakamotoprescribed states that the agent points
her next block to either of them picked uniformly-at-random.
However, this protocol suffer from two shortcomings. First,
agents must obtain ic prior to creating blocks, failing to do so pre-
vents participation. Therefore, Permissiveness = 0, i.e., it is a per-
missioned protocol.
Moreover, in equilibrium, agents are expected to commit ic suf-
ficient to enable the creation of exactly the number of blocks they
expect. Now, assume an agent becomes absent, either maliciously
or unintentionally. Other agents cannot create new blocks exceed-
ing their quota, and the system halts.
These problems arise as this protocol conditions block creation
on early ic expenditure, justifying HEB’s design of incentivizing,
but not forcing agents to internally spend.
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Algorithm 5: σHEBi,petty
1 Function Allocate(SG , Bi ):
2 return (1 − ρ) B
i
3 Function Generate(SG , SLi ):
4 C ← a uniformly-at-random chain from the longest chains with minimal score.
5 pointer ← last (C )
6 if Ni (C ) <
⌊
Bic
i
ρr
⌋
then
7 type← factored
8 else
9 type← regular
10 return NewBlock(pointer, type)
11 Function Publish(SG , SLi ):
12 return All previously unpublished blocks
B MDP DETAILS
Recall that similarly to previous work [45, 52, 76, 84], our MDP
finds the best-response strategy of agent i for given system param-
eters. Throughout this section we detail the MDP specifics.
We detail the modeling of the other system agents as a single
one, denoted agent ¬i , who follows a prescribed strategy.
As such, we limit the analysis to strategies considering at most
two chains at any given time [20, 40, 72, 76]. The first is the public
chain, followed by agent ¬i , while the other is known only to agent
i (i.e., maintained in her local storage SLi ), named the secret chain.
We follow with detailing the action space, the state space, and
the reward function.
Agent ¬i . As in [20, 40] the agent ¬i comprises infinitely-many,
non-colluding infinitely-small budget agents. She follows a petty-
compliant [20] strategy σHEBpetty that is a variant of σ
HEB
prescribed
( Alg. 5).
In principal, σHEBpetty is like σ
HEB
prescribed
except the tie-breaking de-
cision regarding conflicting longest chains. σHEB
prescribed
states the
agent tie breaks uniformly-at-random from the multiple longest
chains, but σHEBpetty limits the random selection to the longest
chains with the minimum accumulated score.
The intuition for this strategy is as follows. Given a specific
block, its relative block weight is higher on a chain with less ac-
cumulated block weight. As agents get reward based on their rel-
ative score, and assuming the chain they pick ends up being the
main chain, they have a direct incentive to pick the chain that has
a lower accumulated score. That is, this strategy is more logical
from an agent’s perspective as it is expected to increase her ex-
pected income.
Similarly to Carlsten et al. [20], the petty-compliant strategy by
itself is not harmful (even if we did consider spontaneous forks),
yet it enables the rational agent to utilize a wider range of strate-
gies. By setting agent ¬i to follow this strategy we increase agent
i’s plausible strategy space, thus producing more conservative re-
sults.
By modeling the agent ¬i to comprise infinitely-many, non-
colluding infinitely-small budget agents, and to follow σHEBpetty we
only increase the ability of agent i to increase her expected income
by deviating from σHEBprescribed. We illustrate that with the following
example.
Example B.1. Assume the last block last (C) on the main chain
C is a factored block created by agent ¬i . According to σHEB
prescribed
the next block should point to last (C) and extend C . Assume the
scheduler lets agent i create the next block, and she creates a reg-
ular block that point to the same block as last (C), publishing it
immediately.
That is, the agent i has created a conflicting longest chain, so
LC
(
SG
)
= {C1,C2}. Assume that by the rational agent’s strategy
she will point her next created block to last (C2).
Note thatW (C1) −W (C2) = F − 1 > 0 and agent ¬i follows
σHEBpetty, therefore if she is picked to create the next block she will
deterministically choose to point it to last (C2).
That means that independently of which agent gets to create
the next block, last (C1) will not be pointed by following blocks,
effectively removing it from any future longest chain. That means
agent i had managed to replace a factored block agent ¬i with her
own regular block on the main chain, increasing her block weight
while decreasing that of agent ¬i , both effectively increasing her
expected income.
If agent ¬i had followed σHEB
prescribed
then she would have pointed
her next block to last (2) with probability of only 12 , as both C1
and are C2 are of the same length. That means that block last (C1)
might still end on the concluding main chain (depending on agent
i’s strategy and which of the agents gets picked by the scheduler),
resulting with lower expected block weight for agent i .
In a running system it is less likely that an agent will prefer to
extend a chain excluding a previous block she already created, as
that lowers her block weight and expected income. Moreover, dif-
ferent agents may pick randomly different chains. By modeling all
the other agents in the system as infinitely-small budget agents
we can neglect the effect of any single agent with different incen-
tives than that of the others, again, increasing agent i’s plausible
strategy space.
Action space. Agent i’s actions are elements in the form
{chain_manipulation, block_type}. The field chain_manipulation
describes how agent i interacts with the two plausible secret and
public chains, and may contain either one of the three values —
publish, adopt and wait. The value of publish indicates the agent
publishes the blocks of the secret chain, a value of adopt indicates
the agent abandons the secret chain and adopts the public chain,
and wait indicates the agent does neither the former nor the latter.
The field block_type has a binary value, describing whether the
next block the agent creates is factored.
State space. States are elements in the form of
{attack_chain,main_chain, fork}. The fields attack_chain and
main_chain represent the content of the secret and public chains.
Note these fields may have a common prefix. The field fork has
a binary value indicating whether agent ¬i is partitioned with
regards to which of the two chains to extend. Note that fork is
true only if agent i had previously published her chain.
Reward function. Rewarding states are those where either
the secret or the public chain are of ℓ blocks, that is
length (attack_chain) = ℓ or length (main_chain) = ℓ. Note that
this restricts agent i to strategies bounded by the creation of ℓ
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Algorithm 6: σHEBi,brute
1 Function Allocate(SG , Bi ):
2 return
〈
0, B
i
〉
3 Function Generate(SG , SLi ):
4 pointer ← latest block in SL
i
5 return NewBlock(pointer,"regular")
6 Function Publish(SG , SL
i
):
7 if number of blocks in SLi < ℓ then
8 return
9 else
10 return All previously unpublished ℓ blocks
blocks, which are feasible with negligible probability [45]. These
states indicate the epoch conclusion and hence the reward distri-
bution of HEB.
Note. In [45, 76] the authors analyze an infinite game and intro-
duce a truncation parameter T , capping the length of the secret and
public chains. In their system the publication (adoption) of the secret
(public) chain leads to the initial state, and it accumulates rewards
at state-transitions rather than at a set of final states. Their state
space includes counters of the blocks in the secret and public chains,
resulting in a state space complexity of O
(
T 2
)
.
Such an analysis is inapplicable for HEB as it is described by a fi-
nite game, and the reward is distributed at the final concluding states.
However, we cannot simply count blocks on the two chains but have to
maintain their order, resulting in a state space complexity of O
(
2ℓ
)
.
As an example, consider the situation where agent i has created a
factored and a regular blocks on the secret chain, and then agent ¬i
creates a factored block on the public chain. If the honest block pre-
cedes the factored block on the secret chain, then agent i can publish
the regular block, resulting with agent ¬i deterministically adopting
it and forfeiting her recently-created factored block. However, if the
factored block precedes the regular one, then publishing the first block
will result in a fork, resembling Lead-Stubborn Mining [72].
Note. The MDPs of [45, 76] have no final states, and they itera-
tively optimize the preferred action in each state, only stopping when
meeting some precision criteria. This results with an approximation
of the optimal strategy.
The HEB MDP has final states (where the longest chain is of
length ℓ) and there are no re-occurrences (i.e., non-ergodic states).
Essentially, the HEB MDP is a dynamically-programmed brute-force
search on all possible strategies. As such, it does not lead an approxi-
mation but the actual best-response strategy.
C BRUTE FORCE STRATEGY
This section presents the formalization of σHEBi,brute (Alg. 6).
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